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Introduction

onventional electricity generation is by far the largest
source of air pollutants that harm human health and contribute to global warming. For instance, emissions from
just nine conventional power plants in Illinois directly contributed to 300 premature deaths, 14,000 asthma attacks, and more
than 400 thousand daily incidents of upper respiratory symptoms
per year among the 33 million people living within 250 miles of
the plants.1 Moreover, fossil-fueled power plants in the United
States emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
in 2003, more than ten times the amount of CO2 compared to the
next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.2 Of all American
industries, electricity generation is—by substantial margins—
the single largest contributor of the pollutants responsible for
global warming.
For these and other sobering reasons, many state governments promote renewable energy technologies though policies
such as renewable portfolio
standards (“RPS”) and fees such
as a systems benefit charges
(“SBCs”). By these mechanisms, state regulators intend to
correct three major failures of
the existing “free” market for
electricity fuels. First, electricity
prices do not reflect the social
costs of generating power. Hidden costs, or negative externalities such as the need to secure
foreign imports of fuel, environmental damage from resource
extraction, air and water emissions, medical expenses associated
with air pollution, and the risk of climate change, are not typically reflected in the rates Americans pay for electricity.
Second, energy subsidies create an unfair market advantage
for conventional energy technologies. A majority of the federal
budget for energy research and development over the past fifty
years has gone to conventional fossil fuel and nuclear industries
and not toward renewable energy technologies. From 1948 to
1998, for instance, roughly eighty percent of U.S. Department of
Energy appropriations for research and development (“R&D”)
have gone to nuclear and fossil fuel technologies.3 Even though
coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy industries are relatively
mature sectors, federal R&D expenditures continue to favor
these industries. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2006, for example, the
federal government allotted $580 million in R&D funds to fossil
fuels and $221 million to the nuclear industry. The wind indus-

try, in contrast, received only $38.3 million.4
Third, renewable energy generation is subject to a free
rider problem. Since everyone benefits from the environmental
advantages of renewable energy, private companies that invest
millions of dollars in researching and developing clean energy
technologies are often unable to recover the full profit of their
investments. Inevitably, the market allows some consumers to
be free riders, benefiting from the investments of others without
paying for them.

State Government Mechanisms for
Promoting Renewable Energy
State policy interventions intend to stimulate a market for
renewable resources and spur additional research, development,
and implementation of renewable energy technologies. So far,
state governments in the United States have relied predominately on RPSs and SBCs to level the playing field by neutralizing a legacy of unequal federal subsidies and directly requiring
renewable energy. While state
policies are innovative and well
intentioned, the time has come
to shift to federal regulation and
intervention. Continued reliance
on state-based activity alone will
ironically promote more market
externalities and “free riding”
than harmonized federal action.

Energy subsidies create an
unfair market advantage
for conventional energy
technologies.

5

System Benefit Charges

Systems benefit charges
(also called public benefit funds,
system benefit funds, and clean energy funds) originated in the
1990s at a time when state policy makers were considering electric utility restructuring legislation. Afraid that gains made in
pursuing research, development, and implementation of environmentally-preferable renewable energy technologies would
end after markets were deregulated, advocates of the novel
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technologies won concessions in some states for a new funding
mechanism for high-risk or long-term projects. A SBC places a
small tax on every kilowatt hour (“kWh”) of electricity generated and utilizes those funds to pursue socially-beneficial energy
projects.5 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates that
SBCs have been responsible for promoting 1,117 megawatts
(“MW”) of renewable energy capacity.6
SBCs were first implemented in Washington State in 1994
and were endorsed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1995 as a way to fund services that had previously been
included in customers’ bills from regulated utility companies.7 As
part of the negotiations for California’s restructuring law, environmental advocates won a provision for a public benefit fund
that would expend at least $872 million on energy-efficiency
work from 1998 to the end of 2001 and would allocate $540
million on renewable energy projects.8 To develop renewable
energy technologies and other programs expected to struggle
after deregulation, the California Energy Commission created its
Public Interest Energy Research program, which initially drew
about $62 million annually from the state’s SBC.9
By 2006, fifteen states created SBCs. The seventeen organizations that administer the funds, which are scheduled to total
$4 billion by 2017, collaborate through a nonprofit organization
called the Clean Energy States Alliance. The organization sponsors original research, collects information and analyses, and
seeks to expand the use of clean energy technologies with a special emphasis on solar, wind, and fuel cells. Moreover, the group
seeks to increase the efficiency of state research by eliminating
duplication of efforts and by providing forums for the states to
share knowledge and insights.10

Renewable Portfolio Standards
An RPS is a legislative mandate requiring electricity suppliers (often referred to as “load serving entities”) in a given
geographical area to employ renewable resources to produce a
certain percentage of power by a fixed date.
An RPS program transfers the risk of renewable energy
investments from regulators to investors.11 RPS uses the market as a mechanism to determine the efficacy of any given technology; as a result, higher costs, if they occur, are distributed
evenly throughout society to those that benefit from them, and
are blended with the lower costs of existing conventional generation. 12
Unlike instruments developed by public utility commissions
with long and complex procedures, often followed by litigation,
RPSs are bureaucratically simple.13 RPSs enable customers to
pay producers directly for renewable energy, obviating the need
for the administration of funds by government agencies. And,
unlike a one-time award for funds, no project is guaranteed a
place in the market.14
First implemented by Iowa and Minnesota in the 1980s,
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have already
passed RPS laws requiring utilities to use renewable resources
as a portion of their overall provision of electricity.15 Four other
states have nonbinding renewable energy goals.16 Five more
states—Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Utah—are
Fall 2007

considering mandating some form of RPS. Of the approximate
9,000 MW of wind energy in the United States, roughly fifty
percent, or 4,500 MW, have been promoted directly by RPS policies, whereas ten percent, or 900 MW, have been promoted by
SBCs from 2001 to 2006.17
Figure 1: Annual U.S. Wind Energy Development by State
Policy Mechanism, 2001 to 2006

The Case for Federal Intervention
There are three reasons, however, why continued reliance
on state-based efforts such as SBCs and RPSs will be insufficient to promote renewable energy technologies in the United
States on the scale needed to fight climate change.

Improving Reliability
First, federal intervention is needed to improve electricity reliability. Contrary to what some opponents of renewable
energy assert, the variability of renewable resources becomes
easier to manage the more they are deployed. Electrical and
power systems engineers have long held the principle that the
larger a system becomes, the less reserve capacity it needs.
Demand variations between individual consumers are mitigated
by grid interconnection in exactly this manner. When a single
electricity consumer, for example, starts drawing more electricity than the system allocated for each consumer, the strain on the
system is insignificant because so many consumers are drawing
from the grid that it is entirely likely another consumer will be
drawing less to make up the difference. This “averaging” works
in a similar fashion on the supply side of the grid. Individual
wind turbines average out each other in electricity supply.18 So
when the wind is not blowing through one wind farm, it is likely
blowing harder through another.
Because the technical availability of one wind turbine rivals
that of a single conventional power plant, wind farms of hundreds
or thousands of turbines have even greater reliability because it
is unlikely that all turbines would be down at the same time. Furthermore, when turbines do malfunction, they take far less time
to recover than massive conventional power plants or nuclear
reactors that have literally millions of individual components,
arranged in complex circuits prone to mechanical failure.19 Analysts already confirmed the benefit of wind power’s greater technical availability in the United States. Indeed, a November 2006
study assessing the widespread use of wind power in Minnesota
6

concluded that “wind generation does make a calculable contribution to system reliability” by decreasing the risk of large,
unexpected outages.20
Improved reliability of supply is important, as blackouts and
brownouts exact a considerable toll on the American economy.
The U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) estimates that while
power interruptions often last only seconds or minutes, they cost
consumers an average of $150 to 400 billion every year.21 The
Electric Power Research Institute projects the annual costs of
poor power reliability at $119 billion, or forty-four percent of all
electricity sales in 1995.22
However, to capture such benefits, renewable energy technologies must be spatially deployed in every state and must have
national penetration rates above ten percent. Penetration rates of
renewable energy technologies nationwide are still low—around
three percent of overall installed electricity capacity in 2007.
Collective state efforts are expected to increase this amount to
only around four percent by 2015 and five percent by 2030, but
the environmental benefits of renewable energy only really start
to accrue at penetration rates well above this rate. Federal intervention in the form of a nation-wide SBC or RPS aiming for targets of ten to twenty percent by
2020 would expand the diversity
of technologies used to access
renewable resources.

Improving Energy
Security

A deliberate, aggressive,
well-coordinated assault
on the electric power grid
could devastate the
electricity sector.

Second, larger penetration
rates are needed to ensure energy
security. This is because the
geographical dispersion of generators not only improves their
overall reliability; it makes them
more secure—and thus resilient
to accidental power outages and
failure, or intentional attack and disruption. Notwithstanding
intense media focus on the security dangers from nuclear reactors and natural gas facilities, the nation’s power grid represents
an equally serious threat to energy security. The security issues
facing the modern electric utility grid are almost as serious as
they are invisible.
For example, in 1975 the New World Liberation Front
bombed assets of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company more
than ten times, and members of the Ku Klux Klan and San
Joaquin Militia have been convicted of attempting to attack electricity infrastructure.23 Internationally, organized paramilitaries
such as the Farabundo-Marti National Liberation Front were
able to interrupt more than ninety percent of electric service in El
Salvador and even had manuals for attacking power systems.24
Some caution that all it would take to cause a “cascade of
power failures across the country,” costing billions of dollars in
direct and indirect damage, is a few motivated people with minivans and a couple of mortars and balloons, which they would
use to chaff substations and disrupt transmission lines.25 A deliberate, aggressive, well-coordinated assault on the electric power
7

grid could devastate the electricity sector. Replacement time
would be “on the order of Iraq,” not “on the order of a lineman
putting things up a pole.”26
Several recent trends in the electric utility industry have
increased the vulnerability of its infrastructure. To improve their
operational efficiency, many utilities and system operators have
increased their reliance on automation and computerization.
Low margins and various competitive priorities have encouraged industry consolidation, with fewer and bigger facilities and
intensive use of assets in one place. As the National Research
Council noted, “control is more centralized, spare parts inventories have been reduced, and subsystems are highly integrated
across the entire business.”27
Federal promotion of renewable energy on a national scale
can improve the security of the grid by decentralizing electricity generation. Even when renewable resources like wind and
solar are concentrated, the tendency for them to produce power
in incremental and modular amounts makes it much more difficult to disrupt large segments of generation. The International
Energy Agency has noted that centralized energy facilities create
significant targets for terrorism because attacking a few facilities
can cause large power outages.28
In contrast to the security risks
of large centralized generators,
decentralizing energy facilities
and providing power through
more modular and distributed
energy systems minimizes the
risk of accidents and grid failures, and does not require transporting or storing hazardous or
radioactive materials. Analysts
have tended to refer to renewable energy systems (and other
forms of distributed generation
such as fuel cells and small-scale cogeneration units) as “supple”
power technologies because they are modular suited to dispersed
siting.29 A national RPS or SBC promoting renewables could
greatly contribute to the overall security of the nation’s electric
infrastructure by forcing more technologies into the portfolio of
all American utilities.

Providing Climate Benefits
Third, and perhaps most important, federal intervention is
needed to fight climate change and minimize “free-riding” going
on in states that have chosen to rely on nuclear and fossil fuels
to generate electricity, instead of promoting renewable energy.
The DOE has already determined that only “the imposition of [a
national] RPS would lead to lower generation from natural gas
and coal facilities.”30 Examinations of fuel generation in several
states confirm this finding, as well as the tendency for a national
RPS to displace oil-fired generation, which is still a significant
source of electricity in Florida, New York, and Hawaii. Equally
important, but often overlooked, is how SBC- or RPS-induced
renewable generation would offset nuclear power in several
regions of the United States.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Researchers in North Carolina, for example, determined
that a state-wide RPS would displace facilities relying on
nuclear fuels and minimize the environmental impacts associated with the extraction of uranium used to fuel nuclear reactors.31 In Oregon, the Governor’s Renewable Energy Working
Group analyzed a twenty-five percent statewide RPS by 2025
and projected that every fifty MW of renewable energy would
displace approximately twenty MW of base-load resources,
including nuclear power.32 Environment Michigan estimates that
a twenty percent RPS by 2020 would displace the need for more
than 640 MW of power that would have otherwise come from
both nuclear and coal facilities.33
By offsetting the generation of conventional and nuclear
power plants, only large-scale renewable energy penetration
rates would avoid many of the environmental and social costs
associated with the mining, processing, transportation, combustion, and clean-up of fossil and nuclear fuels. By promoting technologies that displace conventional forms of electricity
generation, federal promotion of renewable energy would substantially decrease air pollution in the United States. A single one
MW wind turbine running at only thirty percent of capacity for
one year displaces more than 1,500 tons of carbon dioxide, 2.5
tons of sulfur dioxide 3.2 tons of
nitrous oxides, and 60 pounds of
toxic mercury emissions.34
One study assessing the
environmental potential of a 580
MW wind farm located on the
Altamont Pass near San Francisco, California, concluded that
the turbines displaced hundreds
of thousands of tons of air pollutants each year that would
have otherwise resulted from
fossil fuel combustion. 35 The study estimated that the wind farm
would displace more than twenty-four billion pounds of nitrous
oxides, sulfur dioxides, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide
over the course of its twenty-year lifetime—enough to cover
the entire city of Oakland, California in a pile of toxic pollution
forty-stories high.36
Renewable energy technologies possess an even greater ability to mitigate climate change. The International Atomic Energy
Agency estimates that when direct and indirect carbon emissions are included, coal plants are around ten times more carbon
intensive than solar technologies and more than forty times more
carbon intensive than wind technologies. Natural gas fares little
better, at three times as carbon intense as solar and twenty times
as carbon intensive as wind.37 The Common Purpose Institute estimates that renewable energy technologies could offset as much as
0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every MWh of generation. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned
Scientists, a twenty percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 434 million metric tons by 2020—a reduction of
fifteen percent below “business as usual” levels, or the equivalent
to taking nearly seventy-one million automobiles off the road.38

Figure 2: Direct and Indirect Carbon Emissions
by Electricity Technology
(equivalent grams of CO2/kWh) 39

These estimates are not simply theoretical. Between 1991
and 1997 renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands
reduced that country’s annual emissions of CO2 between 4.4
million and 6.7 million tons. Renewable technologies were so
successful at displacing greenhouse gas emissions that Europe
now views renewable energy as “the major tool of distribution
utilities in meeting industry CO2 reduction targets.”40

Conclusion
Given such obvious and
overwhelming advantages, it is
hard to believe that many utilities and policymakers diligently
oppose national promotion
on renewable energy, repeating
myths that have long since been
debunked. Largely, the remaining objections to federal intervention constitute a diminishing
series of canards that mischaracterize a national SBC or RPS as an unnecessary federal intervention in a relatively free market. Forgetting that a majority of
states are well on their way to imposing their own clunky, overlapping, inconsistent, competing, and sometimes irrational mess
of mandates, opponents churn out four war-torn myths every
time the issue is considered:
The first criticism is that a national SBC or RPS would create “winners and losers.” In reality, all states have renewable
resources they can affordably develop. However, under the
current system of state mandates, some states are “losers” by
subsidizing the cheap, polluting electricity in other states. Other
states are victims to inconsistencies between state mandates that
produce perverse predatory trade-offs and require them to export
their cheap in-state renewable electricity in exchange for more
expensive electricity or renewable energy credits. A national
mandate would level the playing field by creating consistent,
uniform rules and by allowing utilities to purchase renewable
energy credits or develop renewable resources anywhere they
are cost competitive.
The second criticism is that a national mandate would
increase electricity rates. However, in most states, renewable

An RPS program transfers
the risk of renewable
energy investments from
regulators to investors.
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energy mandates have not significantly increased rates and a
consensus of economic models predict that a national policy
would generate substantial consumer savings over the existing
patchwork of state programs. By expanding the amount of
energy that would offset gas-fired generation, a federal intervention would reduce demand on a strained and volatile natural
gas market. Renewable energy units with markedly faster leadtimes than conventional and nuclear reactors speeds the cost
recovery of critical transmission investments and reduces the
rate increases needed to pay for new transmission.
Another common criticism is that a federal mandate would
harm the utilities sector in the form of future profits they will
not be able to recover from consumers through higher electricity
rates. For policymakers, balancing utility profits with electricity prices is one of the hard decisions we elect them to make.
However, elected officials should consider that utility claims of
lost profit are short-sited and strategically unsound. In reality, a
more predictable regulatory environment decreases utility litigation and compliance costs relative to a growing tangle of vague
and unstable state mandates. Expanding the universe of eligible
renewable resources and establishing clear, uniform trading rules
creates far more flexibility for regulated utilities and rewards
utility investments on the basis of smart market strategy. By
promoting a robust domestic renewable energy manufacturing
sector, a national mandate reduces the costs utilities pay in unfavorable exchange rates for foreign parts and labor and redirects
those investments to the U.S. labor market.
A final criticism is that a national RPS or SBC would promote only least-cost options such as wind turbines and landfill gas generators (and not solar photovoltaic, solar thermal,

small-scale hydroelectric, and geothermal plants). Existing state
programs, however, reveal that mandates with broad qualifying resource eligibility actually have led to the development of
many different renewable resources. Utilities have already demonstrated that they can meet state requirements by deploying a
diverse portfolio of renewable resources that best match their
service areas. By geographically and monetarily expanding the
market for renewable resources, a national RPS is likely to further diversify the deployment of renewable energy technologies.
In Nevada, geothermal energy may be cheaper to develop than
wind. In the Pacific Northwest, incremental hydroelectric power
may be cheaper than solar. In the Southeast, biomass may be the
most affordable. A national RPS mandate with a fuel-based definition of eligible renewable resources ensures that free market
principles, rather than regulatory set-asides or political patronage, determine which technologies will be most cost competitive
in certain areas of the country. An added bonus is that a national
RPS decreases compliance costs for regulated utilities, since a
technology-neutral mandate allows utilities to meet RPS obligations using the technology that is most cost competitive for the
fuels available.
Ultimately, by establishing a consistent, national mandate
and uniform trading rules, a national SBC or RPS can create a
more just and predictable regulatory environment for utilities
while jump-starting a robust national renewable energy technology sector. By offsetting electricity that utilities would otherwise generate with conventional and nuclear power, a federal
action would decrease electricity prices for American consumers
while protecting human health and the environment at a scale
and magnitude not possible with state programs.
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